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ON THE CONFLATION OF THE STATE SECRETS 
PRIVILEGE AND THE TOTTEN DOCTRINE
d. a. JeremY telman*
i. intrOduCtiOn
In Intolerable Abuses, an article recently published in the Alabama Law Review,1 I criticized the 
Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc.,2 in which the court dismissed, 
before defendant had answered the complaint, plaintiffs’ claims alleging that Jeppesen Dataplan had assisted 
in an illegal government program of  extraordinary rendition and torture.  Five judges purportedly 
based their dismissal of  plaintiffs’ claims on the state secrets privilege (SSP) alone, while the fifth 
and deciding vote urged dismissal based on both the SSP and the Totten doctrine.3  Intolerable Abuses 
argues that both the majority and the lone concurring judge erred because their analyses conflated 
the SSP and the Totten doctrine.  They thus imported reasoning appropriate to assessing claims 
brought by parties that had entered into voluntary agreements with the government (or its contrac-
tors) into a case involving torts claims.  
In his Response,4 Major Robert Barnsby likens the objections to the Jeppesen Dataplan decision 
raised in Intolerable Abuses to “a baseball team asking for a highly qualified umpire to stand behind 
home plate, then arguing that the umpire is not doing his job when he calls a strike on that team.”5  
The problem with the analogy is that, because Jeppesen Dataplan was decided on a pre-Answer mo-
tion to dismiss, the “umpires” in Jeppesen Dataplan could not call a strike because the players had yet 
*     Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of  Law, Valparaiso University Law School.  The Author 
thanks Christina Phillips for her research assistance on this project.
1  D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ala. l. rev. 429 (2012) 
[hereinafter Intolerable Abuses].
2  614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.CT. 2442 (2011).
3  In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), the administrator of  the estate of  William A. Lloyd brought suit 
to enforce an espionage contract allegedly entered into between Mr. Lloyd and President Lincoln.  Intolerable Abuses, 
supra note 1, at 440.  The Totten doctrine precludes any suit to enforce a secret agreement with the government, or a 
secret promise by the government.  Such claims are non-justiciable.  See id. at 441-42 (summarizing Totten’s holding and 
reasoning).
4  Robert E. Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman, 63 ala. l. rev. 667 (2012) 
[hereinafter Response].
5  Id. at 668.
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to take the field.  If  the baseball analogy is to serve, then what happened in Jeppesen Dataplan is more 
akin to umpires declaring the winner of  the World Series on opening day, before the first pitch is 
thrown.  The Ninth Circuit “umpires” acknowledged that they did not and could not know which 
team was superior.  They ruled that the entire season must be called because proceeding would 
endanger national security in ways that the “umpires” were not at liberty to specify or to share with 
interested parties.  We would not accept such an outcome in baseball, and we certainly should not 
accept it in the federal court system.6  
This brief  Reply to Major Barnsby’s Response highlights the ways in which that Response typifies 
the government’s conflation of  the SSP with Totten so as to transform it from an evidentiary privi-
lege into a broad doctrine of  immunity applied in favor of  the federal government and its contrac-
tors after ex parte proceedings.  Major Barnsby contends that “the government should continue to be 
allowed to use the SSP to put an end to litigation that might expose national security information,” 
and he writes as if  pre-discovery dismissal of  a case is the “entire purpose”7 of  the SSP.  That char-
acterization of  the SSP indicates a fundamental confusion about the nature of  the doctrine. The Re-
sponse’s mischaracterization of  the SSP derives from a conflation of  the SSP, an evidentiary privilege, 
with the Totten doctrine, which provides that suits to enforce secret agreements with the government 
are non-justiciable.8   
The Reply proceeds in three sections.  First, the Reply quickly corrects three mischaracterizations 
of  Intolerable Abuses.  Next, with reference to the recent Fazaga case,9 the Reply illustrates the continu-
ing impact of  Jeppesen Dataplan on SSP litigation, especially because it encourages courts to treat the 
Totten doctrine as an element of  the SSP.  Finally, the Reply addresses the Response’s claim that Intoler-
able Abuses constitutes an overreaction to the problems raised by the SSP.  
ii. three miSCharaCterizatiOnS Of InTolerable abuses
Those who support the use of  the SSP to dismiss cases before discovery often characterize such 
cases as forcing judges to choose between national security and civil liberties.10  But Intolerable Abuses 
maintains that the SSP almost never necessitates such a choice.  Courts have ample means of  pro-
6  The Response states that the SSP cannot be used lawfully to “defend criminal or willful conduct on behalf  of  the 
government” and that it was not so used in Jeppesen Dataplan.  Id. at 687-88.  This is incorrect.  The SSP is an absolute bar 
and operates to exclude evidence or end litigation regardless of  the nature of  the claim. United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953).
7  See Response, supra note 4, at 669, 678 (stating that “the entire purpose of  the [SSP] is to put an end to litigation that 
might expose national security information”).
8  See Totten, 92 U.S. at 106-07 (dismissing claims on behalf  of  an alleged Civil War spy who had alleged a contractual 
agreement with President Lincoln).
9  Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of  Investigation, Case No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx) (C.D. Ca. Aug. 14, 2012), slip op. at 13 
(citations to Jeppesen Dataplan omitted).
10  See, e.g., Response, supra note 4, passim (contending that some cases create an “irreconcilable conflict” between 
national security and civil liberties, which courts must settle in favor of  national security); Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 
1073 (observing that “there are times when exceptional circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between” liberty, 
judicial transparency, and national security).
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tecting civil liberties without disclosing national security information.  They do so in the criminal 
context through the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),11 and they used to do so in the 
civil context by allowing cases to proceed without the introduction of  information subject to the 
SSP.  Decisions such as Jeppesen Dataplan undermine our government’s commitment to civil liber-
ties without providing any national security benefit that could not be achieved through less onerous 
means.
A. Intolerable Abuses Does Not Advocate the Disclosure of  National Security Information 
The Response notes that, once sensitive information is “released through the litigation process 
(even as early as the discovery stage), that critical bell cannot be un-rung.”12  That is certainly true, 
but since Intolerable Abuses does not advocate the release of  sensitive information,13 the argument is 
not relevant.  The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as being hostile to all government’s asser-
tions of  the SSP.  It is not.  The government should assert the SSP whenever necessary to prevent 
the disclosure of  national security secrets.  However, the consequence of  a successful assertion of  
the SSP is not an end to the litigation; the litigation simply proceeds without the privileged evi-
dence.14
The Response attempts to illustrate the dangers of  releases of  sensitive information through a 
discussion of  alleged leaks of  vital information during the prosecution of  those responsible for the 
World Trade Center Bombing of  1993.15  However, that example is inapposite, as those leaks were 
the product of  a decision by government attorneys to release classified information in a criminal 
proceeding.16  If  anything, the Response’s example supports the argument in Intolerable Abuses that the 
political branches are the source of  almost all national security leaks and that the Executive Branch’s 
mistrust of  courts as incapable of  protecting secrets is ill-founded.17
 B. Intolerable Abuses Does Not Call for Judgment for Plaintiffs Each Time the SSP Is Invoked
The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as advocating “automatic judgment for the plaintiff  
if  the government invokes the privilege, as a way of  socializing the costs to the government of  as-
11  Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96−456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
app. 3,  §§ 1-16 (2006)).
12  Response, supra note 4, at 674. 
13  See Intolerable Abuses, (“[N]othing here proposed would entail any public disclosure of  state secrets unless the 
government chose to do so.”).
14  See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (observing that when the SSP is successfully asserted, the 
“result is simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, 
with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of  the evidence”) (quoting mCCOrmiCk’S handBOOk Of the 
law Of evidenCe 233 (1972)).
15  See Response, supra note 4, at 684-85.  
16  Response, supra note 4, at 685 (citing James Taranto, Two Decades of  Pursuing al Qaeda, Wall St. J., Sept 10, 2011, at 
A13).
17  See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 497 (noting the lack of  evidence showing courts to be the source of  national 
security leaks).
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serting the privilege.”18  The Response calls this position “ridiculous”19 and it certainly is.  The clos-
est Intolerable Abuses comes to making any such argument is to advocate that the SSP operate like 
any other evidentiary privilege and not as both a sword and a shield for the government.20  In the 
rare cases when the SSP is found to prevent plaintiffs from being able to establish a prima facie case, 
courts may dismiss cases on SSP grounds.  On the other hand, in the even rarer cases where the SSP 
is found to prevent the government or its contractors from establishing their affirmative defenses, a 
court may have no alternative but to order judgment for the plaintiffs.
There likely would be almost no cases that would yield the latter result because, with the govern-
ment’s cooperation, courts can almost always find a way for litigation to proceed without endanger-
ing national security secrets.  If  the government had to choose between losing on summary judg-
ment and working with courts and plaintiffs’ attorneys to allow litigation to proceed while protecting 
against the disclosure of  national security secrets, the government would have less incentive to seek 
an end to litigation through the SSP.  The Response’s representation of  an argument that would apply 
to almost no cases as one that would apply to all cases in which the government asserts the SSP is 
a product of  its conflation of  the SSP and Totten.  The Response treats pre-discovery dismissal as the 
natural outcome of  an assertion of  the SSP.21  But that is not how evidentiary privileges operate.  
C. The Problem of  Overclassification
Intolerable Abuses reports on the widespread consensus that overclassification is a problem and 
discusses the current classification system, which creates incentives for overclassification and does 
not penalize overclassification.22  The Response attempts a partial defense of  government classification 
policies.  The Response contends that it is “administratively burdensome” to have too many classified 
documents23 and so that is one consideration that prevents overclassification.  In addition, Major 
Barnsby notes that he is unaware of  any intentional overclassification.24
Intolerable Abuses never contends that the problem of  overclassification is the product of  people 
intentionally classifying materials that they know should not be classified.  Overclassification occurs 
despite the best intentions and good faith of  those with the authority to classify.  The problem is 
that the incentives are set up so that, when in doubt, people classify, as former CIA Director Porter 
Goss and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and countless others have acknowledged.25  
18  Response, supra note 4 at 680.
19  Id.
20  Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 487-94 (“If  the SSP deprives plaintiffs of  information necessary to their claim, the 
court may have to dismiss the complaint; although for reasons discussed below, that extreme remedy should rarely be 
necessary.”).
21  See Response, supra note 4 at 678 (“[T]he entire purpose of  the [SSP] is to put an end to litigation that might expose 
national security information. . . .”).
22  Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 442-46.
23  Response, supra note 4 at 682-83.
24  Id. at 682
25  See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 443 (citing comments by then Congressmen Goss and Rumsfeld on the 
problem of  overclassification).  
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In contending that “those in the field . . . distinctly do not have an incentive to overclassify,”26 the 
Response references a recent report by the Brennan Center for Justice.27  That report itself  identifies 
the same problems with incentives that encourage overclassification highlighted in Intolerable Abuses.28
iii. Jeppesen DaTaplan’S legaCY: COnflatiOn Of ToTTen and the SSP in Fazaga v. F.b.I.
Although the Response characterizes the result in Jeppesen Dataplan as the product of  a court reach-
ing the same conclusion via two separate doctrines,29 its conclusions are entirely the product of  the 
erroneous conflation of  Totten, a contracts doctrine, with the SSP.  This is necessarily so because the 
SSP, properly understood as an evidentiary privilege, could never result in the pre-discovery dis-
missal of  a case.  Before a court knows what evidence will be relevant to the parties’ legal positions, 
it cannnot determine whether or not a case can proceed without privileged evidence.
The purpose of  evidentiary privileges such as the SSP is not to end litigation but to permit it 
to continue without the information subject to the privilege.  In cases in which it is difficult for the 
litigation to proceed, courts may avail themselves of  in camera proceedings conducted by security-
cleared counsel – or even of  ex parte proceedings – in order to prevent the disclsoure of  secret infor-
mation.   The record of  such in camera proceedings can be sealed.30  
The Reynolds case31 on which the Response relies,32 recognized the SSP as an evidentiary privilege, 
which may excuse the government from certain discovery obligations,33 but the question of  whether 
the SSP can be grounds for dismissal was never raised in Reynolds.34  The Response reads as if  some 
Supreme Court precedent guided the Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen Dataplan and left it no choice but to 
dismiss the case before an Answer had been filed.35  The Supreme Court has never weighed in on 
whether the SSP can be a basis for dismissal, and it has never addressed the question of  whether the 
SSP can apply before discovery has begun.  
26  Response, supra note 4 at 683.
27  Id. at 682-83 (citing Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reducing Overclassification 
Through Accountability (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3cb5dc88d210b8558b_38m6b0ag0.pdf).
28  See Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountibility, 
21-38 (2011) (discussing both incentives for overclassification and the lack of  incentives to refrain from or challenge 
overclassification).
29  Response, supra note 4 at 677-78.
30  See Intolerable Abuses, supra note 1 at 494-97 (detailing court-implemented alternatives to dismissal that permitted 
litigation to proceed without disclosure of  classified information); see also D. A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged 
Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 temPle l. rev. 499, 518-22 (2007).
31  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
32  See Response, supra note 4 at 670-71 (characterizing Reynolds as precedent that has not been disturbed in nearly sixty 
years). 
33  Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12 (holding that the United States was excused from its obligation to produce an official 
accident investigation report on the ground that it contained information relating to electronic equipment aboard a 
military aircraft that crashed).
34  See Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
35  See Response, supra note 4 at 688 (arguing that “courts should continue to follow well-established Supreme Court 
precedent” dismissing cases based on the SSP).
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It should go without saying that evidentiary privileges have to do with evidence.  As articulated 
in Reynolds, the SSP comes into play when a party seeks discovery from the government or from 
some other entity in possession of  national security information.36  If  the SSP is successfully in-
voked, and if  there is no way for it to be introduced in camera, it may prevent the plaintiff  from mak-
ing out a prima facie case.  In such cases, the court must dismiss the complaint.  However, in Jeppesen 
Dataplan, plaintiffs made no discovery requests.37  The case was dismissed before they could do so 
and before Jeppesen Dataplan could articulate its defenses.38 
The Response credits the Ninth Circuit for its “searching inquiry into the underlying evidence,”39 
but what was the nature of  that inquiry?  The government submitted classified affidavits through 
which it claimed that there was no way for the case to proceed without the release of  information 
subject to the SSP.  Such a claim makes no sense when the defendant has yet to articulate its legal 
theories and when no discovery has been sought.   
Moreover, both the Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen Dataplan and the Central District of  California in 
Fazaga were explicit in their conflation of  the doctrines.  As the Ninth Circuit explains it, the “con-
temporary state secrets privilege” encompasses two applications of  the principle that courts may 
sometimes have to dismiss cases in order to prevent disclosure of  state secrets: “One completely 
bars adjudication of  claims premised on state secrets (the ‘Totten bar’); the other is an evidentiary 
privilege (the ‘Reynolds privilege’) that excludes privileged evidence from the case and may result in 
dismissal of  the claims.”40  The Central District decision goes further still in blurring any distinction 
between the two doctrines:
There are two modern applications of  the state secrets doctrine: (1) a justiciabilty bar that forecloses 
litigation altogether because the very subject matter of  the case is a state secret (the “Totten bar”) and 
(2) an evidentiary privilege that excludes certain evidence because it implicates secret information 
and may result in dismissal of  claims (the “Reynolds privilege”). . . .  While distinct, the Totten bar and 
the Reynolds privilege converge in situations where the government invokes the privilege – as it may 
properly do – before waiting for an evidentiary dispute to arise during discovery or trial.41
Thus, in small steps, the courts transform an evidentiary privilege into a doctrine that can lead to 
pre-discovery dismissal.
 There are numerous errors in reasoning along the way.  The Jeppesen Dataplan court errs by fold-
ing the Totten doctrine into the “contemporary state secrets privilege.”  It is nothing of  the sort.  It 
is not a privilege, and (thus far) it only has been applied in a handful of  cases brought by people 
who entered  into voluntary agreements with the government.  But even if  courts do not dismiss 
36  Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11.
37  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1076 (2010).
38  Id. at 1076-77.
39  Response, supra note 4 at 675.
40  Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1077 (emphasis in original). 
41  Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau of  Investigation, Case No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx) (C.D. Ca. Aug. 14, 2012), slip op. at 
13 (citations to Jeppesen Dataplan omitted).  
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torts cases based on Totten, Totten has infected their understanding of  the SSP.  Reynolds did concede 
that the SSP could in some cases require dismissal of  a case, but that is no different from having to 
dismiss a prosecution because a key witness has died.  Reynolds did not conceive of  the SSP as neces-
sitating pre-discovery dismissal, and that result cannot be squared with the evidentiary nature of  the 
privilege that the Court recognized in Reynolds.  
With the Jeppesen Dataplan opinion as its guide, the Fazaga court stumbles into erroneous conclu-
sions, blithely stating that the Totten doctine is part of  the SSP and that the “Reynolds privilege” can 
result in pre-discovery dismissal.42  Both of  these statements are doctrinally incoherent.  A justicia-
bility doctrine is not a component of  an evidentiary privilege, and an evidentiary privilege cannot 
provide a basis for dismissal before any evidence has been sought or introduced.
iv. InTolerable abuses dOeS nOt OverState the SignifiCanCe Of the SSP 
A. Is the SSP a Serious Problem?
The Response characterizes Intolerable Abuses as an overreaction to the government’s use of  the 
SSP to end litigation in select cases.43  The Response suggests that because the SSP is seldom invoked 
and only after the Department of  Justice’s “onerous requirements” have been satisfied,44 it is not 
subject to abuse.  But the Response ignores Laura Donohue’s scholarship,45 which details the enor-
mous impact of  the assertion of  the SSP (or the threatened assertion of  the SSP) not only in pub-
lished opinions but also at earlier stages of  litigation.  Donohue summarizes the impact of  the SSP 
as follows:
It has been used to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, creating a form of  
private indemnity for government contractors in a broad range of  areas. Patent law, contracts, trade 
secrets, employment law, environmental law, and other substantive legal areas have similarly been 
affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and unanticipated advantages over 
opponents in the course of  litigation.46
Clearly, the SSP has an impact well beyond that of  high profile cases such as Jeppesen Dataplan.  If  
Intolerable Abuses is to be faulted, it should be on the ground that it, like other scholarship on the SSP 
other than Donohue’s, focuses on the tip of  the iceberg – on reported opinions – rather than on the 
bulk of  the fights over the SSP, which do not make their way into published opinions.  If  anything, 
Intolerable Abuses understates the myriad ways in which the SSP undermines legal processes.
The Response also invokes the additional precautions that the Obama administration has taken to 
42  Id.
43  See Response, supra note 4 at 678-681 (contending that Intolerable Abuses “exhibits an unmerited ‘sky is falling’ 
mentality”).
44  Id. at 679.
45  See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of  State Secrets, 159 u. Pa. l. rev. 77 (2010).
46  Id. at 91.
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prevent abuses of  the SSP.47  This is cold comfort.  Whatever standards are put in place during one 
administration can be abandoned by the next.  In any case, despite the Obama administration’s laud-
able efforts to curb use of  the SSP, its invocation has already effected great harms to our constitu-
tional order because it has prevented the judiciary from serving its constitutional purpose.  Given an 
actual case or controversy, it is the province and duty of  the courts to say what the law is.  Because 
of  the SSP, we do not know what the law is with respect to a whole range of  highly questionable 
policies associated with the War on Terror.  That uncertainty sows distrust of  government actors 
(and their contractors) and cynicism at home, and it harms the reputation of  the United States as 
a member of  the community of  nations.  Moreover, as Jeppesen Dataplan and Fazaga demonstrate, 
despite the Holder Memo, the government continues to use the SSP to seek pre-discovery dismissal 
of  cases, which is never appropriate.  
v. COnCluSiOn
My argument is simple.  The government should invoke the SSP whenever necessary to prevent 
disclosure of  information that might jeopardize national security.  Courts should carefully review as-
sertions of  the SSP and work with government attorneys and plaintiffs’ attorneys, who may include 
court-appointed, security-cleared counsel, to find a way for litigation to proceed without the dis-
closure of  privileged information.  The Totten doctrine can never apply to plaintiffs whose interac-
tion with our government or its contractors was involuntary, and an evidentiary privilege can never 
provide a basis for pre-discovery dismissal of  claims. 
47  See Response, supra note 4 at 679 (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to Heads of  Exec. Dep’ts 
& Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) available at http:/www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf).
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